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 Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of  
Marketing Contract Structures 
 
The proportion of U.S. crop production sold under contract is becoming increasingly 
large. In 2003, 39% of the value of U.S. production was sold under contract compared to 
11% in 1999 and 10% in 2001 (ERS; NASS). Numerous explanations for the increased 
use of contracting have been proposed, including supply-chain organization, more 
discriminating consumers, more efficient relationships between buyers and sellers, 
information asymmetries, quality control, procurement considerations specific to the 
dynamics of agricultural decision making, declining commodity prices, and the 
decoupling of farm support outlined in the 1996 farm bill. 
A contract can be characterized by its allocation of value, risk, and decision-
making rights among the contractor(s) and contractee(s) (Sykuta and Parcell). That 
contracts are structured to efficiently allocate risk between the parties is an assumption 
based in traditional contract theory.  Two very general (and related) hypotheses stemming 
from contract theory include 1) higher levels of risk should imply contracts with a higher 
level of risk-sharing between the contracting parties, and 2) farmers with higher levels of 
risk-aversion will prefer contract structures that shift more of the risk to the contractor.  
Conceptually, one would expect the preferences and characteristics of the contractor and 
contractee, as well as the characteristics of the commodity being contracted, to determine 
the attributes of the optimal contract. 
While the theoretical literature on contracts has been an important and relatively 
recent development in the field of economics, there has been surprisingly little empirical 
work done in the area to test the underlying theoretical assumptions.  In the area of contracts for agricultural production, experimental approaches have provided some 
support for the relationship between the risk attitudes of the producer and contract 
attributes in both crop and livestock contract examples (Lajili et al.; Roe, Sporleder, and 
Belleville).    However, results based on survey responses or those from experimental 
laboratory settings do not provide a reflection of actual contracts being used in practice.   
Moreoever, true empirical studies of contract design have produced more mixed 
results.  Allen and Lueck provided an empirical analysis of the role of risk in contract 
choice using a large data set of land rental agreements between landlords and farmers in 
North America. Using a simple OLS framework, they find little support for the 
hypothesis that risk-sharing is an important determinant in shaping rental agreement 
contracts.  Fraser analyzed data on contracts for wine grapes in Australia, finding that 
producer characteristics do not have a significant effect on contract design in the 
Australian grape industry. 
  Other authors have focused on the impacts of contractor characteristics on 
contract design.  Sykuta and Cook outlined a theoretical framework that suggests 
differences in the attributes of contracts offered through producer and investor owned 
firms motivated by trust of the organization.  An analysis by James and Sykuta of crop 
producers in Missouri provided evidence of a producer preference for marketing to 
cooperatives over private or investor-owned firms due to a higher level of trust for 
cooperative organizations. 
Ackerberg and Botticini built and improved upon previous work using a much 
older data set on crop-sharing agreements in Italy from the 1400s. They proposed a 
model which recognized the potential for endogenous matching of the contracting parties based on their preferences/characteristics as well as the characteristics of the commodity 
being produced. Using an estimation method which controls for this endogenous 
matching, Ackerberg and Botticini found evidence of risk-sharing motivations in their 
data set which would not have been evident had the enogeneity not been accounted for. 
In the present study, we further investigate the determinants of contract design by 
applying the methodology outlined by Ackerberg and Botticini to data from the 
Agricultural Resource and Management Survey (ARMS). The ARMS data lends itself 
well to this purpose, as the ARMS is administered to thousands of producers every year 
by the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) and is designed to provide an 
accurate reflection of the agricultural sector in the U.S. The survey contains a section 
devoted to marketing and production contracts which includes questions regarding the 
structure of each contract, as well as characteristics of the contractor. Furthermore, 
financial accounting data is available for each producer included in the survey. 
We construct and estimate several models to analyze the effects of producer and 
contractor characteristics on the decision to produce under contract and the types of 
contract structures that arise in practice, while controlling for the potential for 
endogenous matching between the parties. Our results indicate that while producer 
characteristics have a significant effect on the decision to produce corn or soybeans under 
contract (regardless of the specific design of the contract), we do not find any significant 
effects of the same producer characteristics on the attributes of the contracts themselves.  
Our results seem to be consistent with the previous findings of Allen and Lueck 
and the hypotheses of Sykuta and Cook in that other factors will play a larger role in 
determining the structure of agricultural contracts.  However, our results should be interpreted with care due to certain data limitations.  Furthermore, the lack of data on the 
value derived from the specific contracts that is comparable across observations makes it 
difficult to separate the effects of compensation from those of producer and contractor 
characteristics.  
If our results prove to be both accurate and robust, there could be wide 
implications in the areas of both contract theory and agricultural contract design. For 
example, if producer and contractor characteristics are not determining factors in the 
design of contracts, advancement in the theoretical literature on other types of incentives 
and transaction cost motivations warrants further investigation. 
Methodology and Data 
Following Ackerberg and Botticini, we start by supposing there exists a general 
relation where contract choice y is determined by characteristics of the principal (p) and 
the agent (a).   
(1)  01 2 yp a α αα =+ + + ε  
Direct estimation of equation 1 could lead to biased coefficient estimates if the 
contracting parties are matched with each other endogenously (i.e. if there exists 
incentives for certain types of farmers to “match” with certain types of contractors).  To 
control for this potential endogeneity bias, Ackerberg and Botticini proposed that an 
instrumental variables approach be used where the actual values of the potentially 
endogenous principal and agent variables in equation 1 be replaced by their fitted values 
estimated from a “matching equation.”  
Data were obtained from the Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) 
which is conducted annually by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.  The ARMS data include detailed information on marketing contracts used by farmers to sell their 
commodities.  Farmers identified the price, quantity, and value for each commodity sold 
with marketing contracts.  The main version of the survey also includes more detailed 
questions about the specifications of the marketing contracts such as the quantity and 
pricing mechanisms, and characteristics of the contractors.   
Due to data availability of the contracting survey questions, the analyses are 
conducted with ARMS data from the main version of the survey for 2003-2005.  The 
ARMS data also include survey weights indicating the number of farms in the U.S. that 
each farm in the survey sample represents.  All estimations are weighted using the 
jackknife approach
2 so that the results are representative of all marketing contracts used 
by U.S. corn and soybean producers.  
  The variables used in the analysis are described below in table 1.  Farm 
characteristics included proxies for size (VP), risk aversion (HHNW, OFI, D/A), and 
other characteristics (Age, Edu, Hobby, θi).  Farmers with greater net wealth and off farm 
income levels were assumed to be less risk averse.  Operations with higher debt-to-asset 
ratios could imply a less risk averse producer (i.e. a willingness to take on more risk 
through higher leverage levels) or a more risk averse producer (i.e. higher leverage levels 
require the operator to take on less risky activities relative to similar operations with less 
leverage).  Additional variables were defined at the contract level to describe the 
organizational structure of the contractor (Coop) and the commodity being contracted 
(Crop). 
                                                 
2 Please refer to Dubman for more details on the jackknife approach and its implementation in analysis of 
the ARMS data. Table 1. Description of variables. 
Variable Description 
Crop  Binary variable which equals one if the contract is for corn and equals 
zero for soybeans. 
Coop  Binary variable which equals one if the contractor is a cooperative and 
equal to zero otherwise. 
θi  Proportion of value of production from crop i (i = corn or soybeans) 
HHNW  Net wealth of the farm household. 
VP  Value of the farm’s total production. 
OFI  Total income earned off the farm. 
D/A  Debt-to-asset ratio for the farm operation 
Hobby  Binary variable which equals one if the operation is defined as a hobby 
farm and equal to zero otherwise. 
Age  Age, in years, of the farm operator. 
Edu  Education level, in years, of the farm operator. 
   
We approached the contracting decision at two different levels.  First, the decision 
of whether to enter into a formal marketing contract was examined by estimating how the 
contracting decision is impacted by farm characteristics and proxies for the risk 
preferences of the producer.  The structure of the contracting decision relationship is 
given in equation 1 where y = 1 if the farmer chooses to enter into a marketing contract 
for crop i and the right hand side variables are defined in table 1.  Match equation 2 was 
estimated by state to control for difference across geographical regions. 
(2) 
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    The farm type variable θi describes the relative intensity of the farm’s production 
of the commodity which is being contract, which is assumed to be and endogenous 
choice of the farm operator.  This endogeneity is controlled for through the estimation of 
a single matching equation for the farm type variable
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  Second, we moved to the contract level to examine the impacts of farm 
characteristics and operator preferences, contractor type, and commodity type on specific 
attributes of the contract.  This relationship is outlined in equation 4.  The specific 
contract attributes analyzed include pricing mechanisms and whether or not the contract 
outlines a specific quantity of the commodity.   
 
(4) 
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  Endogeneity of the contractor and crop type variables is controlled for through 
matching equations 5 and 6, under the assumption that farmers optimally choose which 
crop and with what type of organization to contract.  The matching equations are 
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3 A matching equation for contractor type is not included for the contracting decision relation because 
information about the contractor is only included for those farms who chose to contract.  
Results 
Table 2 reports the results on the producer’s decision to produce corn under a marketing 
contract.  The naïve
4 results of the logit model estimation imply that more intensive corn 
operations will be more likely to enter into market contracts for corn.  However, after 
adjusting for endogeneity, the effect of the farm type was found to be insignificant.  The 
decision to produce corn under contract was estimated to be positively influenced by the 
debt-to-asset ratio of the operation.  One possible explanation for this result is that more 
highly leveraged farms use marketing contracts as mechanisms for market coordination 
to reduce overall risk.   
The age of the farm operator was found to have a negative effect on the decision 
to enter into marketing contracts for corn production.  Age is often used as a proxy for 
risk aversion, with older operators assumed to be less risk averse because of more 
established operations and higher levels of experience.  Hobby farms are estimated to be 
less likely to enter into marketing contracts for corn.  Since hobby farms are small in size 
and contribute a relatively minor contribution to total income, the use of contracts to add 
value and coordinate markets may be rather limited.   
Qualitatively similar results were estimated for the producers’ decisions to grow 
soybeans under a marketing contract and are reported in Table 3.  The intensity of 
soybean production is estimated to have a significant and positive effect on the decision 
to contract soybeans, but is found to be insignificant after adjusting for endogeneity.  
Operations with greater debt-to-asset ratios are more likely to grow soybeans under 
                                                 
4 Following Ackerberg and Botticini, naïve estimates refer to those which were estimated without 
instrumenting to correct for potential endogeneity. contract while older operators and hobby farms are less likely to enter into marketing 
contracts for soybeans.   
Note that the impact of the farm type variable was found to be positive and 
significant for both corn and soybean contract decisions prior to the adjustment for 
endogeneity.  However, once the matching equation is included and the estimates in the 
contracting decision equation are adjusted the effect of the farm type variable is found to 
be insignificant.  At the very least, this implies that endogeneity may be a concern and 
not adjusting for this effect could lead to biased results and inaccurate conclusions related 
to the effect of farm type on the decision to produce corn or soybeans under contract.  
 Table 2. Logit Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable = 1 if the farm produces corn under contract 
 Parameter  Estimates 
Variable Naïve  Adjusted 





























































*Significant at 5% 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses 
N = 1763 Table 3. Logit Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable = 1 if farm produces soybeans under contract 
 Parameter  Estimates 
Variable Naïve  Adjusted 





























































*Significant at 5% 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses 
N = 1763 Tables 4-6 report the parameter estimates for specific contract attributes defined by 
equations 4-6.  Neither producer characteristics nor the organizational structure of the 
contractor were found to have significant effects on the specific design of the marketing 
contract.  Table 4 reports the parameter estimates that determine whether the price 
received under the contract is determine by a formula.  The use of a formula implies a 
larger degree of price uncertainty relative to a contract which outlines a single 
deterministic price.  Therefore, one would expect more risk averse producer to prefer 
contracts that outline a single price.  Similarly more risk averse producers would be 
expected to be more willing to accept contracts with formula prices (more price risk) with 
a cooperative organization that garners greater levels of trust. 
  Table 5 reports the naïve and adjusted logit estimates of the effects of producer 
and contractor characteristics on whether the price received under the contract is 
conditional on quality attributes of the contracted commodity.  Tying price to some 
quality attribute of the commodity may expose the farmer to more price risk driven by 
quality uncertainty, implying more risk averse producers would tend to enter into 
contracts where price was independent of quality attributes.  However, we find no 
evidence of this in the ARMS data. 
  Finally, Table 6 reports both the naïve and adjusted logit estimates where the 
dependent variable is whether or not the contract outlines a specific quantity to be 
delivered by the producer.  Specifying a quantity exposes the producer to a greater share 
of the production risk of the commodity, so one would expect more risk average 
producers to be associated with contractual arrangements that do not specify a quantity to be delivered to the contractor.  Again, we find no evidence of producer or contract 
characteristics having any significant effect on this specific contract attribute. 
 
Table 4. Logit Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable = 1 if the price received is determined by a formula 
 Parameter  Estimates 
Variable Naïve  Adjusted 
Intercept  -3.8908 -5.3781 
Crop  -0.3003 -0.2958 
Coop  -0.0216 1.6060 
HHNW  2.274e-07 2.639e-07 
V of P  1.138e-07 1.566e-07 
OFI  -4.96e-06 -4.1e-06 
D/A  -1.1414 -1.4715 
Hobby  0.4575 0.5088 
Age  0.0229 0.0318 
Edu  0.0395 0.0237 
IL dummy  0.2815 0.6754 
IN dummy  0.4658 1.3449 
IA dummy  -0.00463 0.0517 
OH dummy  -0.1686 -0.2637 
04 dummy  0.7200 0.4878 
05 dummy  0.7214 0.6067 
*Significant at 5% 
 Table 5. Logit Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable = 1 if the price received is based on quality attributes 
 Parameter  Estimates 
Variable Naïve  Adjusted 
Intercept  -5.5856* -5.5642* 
Crop  -0.0553 -0.0854 
Coop  0.5934 0.7121 
HHNW  3.18e-07 3.171e-07 
V of P  -6.49e-07 -6.25e-07 
OFI  2.328e-06 2.254e-06 
D/A  -0.4171 -0.3924 
Hobby  0.7877 0.7979 
Age  0.0219 0.0212 
Edu  0.1808 0.1742 
IL dummy  -1.0227 -0.9599 
IN dummy  0.1442 0.2103 
IA dummy  0.4308 0.4395 
OH dummy  0.4302 0.4452 
04 dummy  -0.1295 -0.1487 
05 dummy  3.3301* 3.2883* 
*significant at 5% 
 Table 6. Logit Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable = 1 if the contract is for a specific quantity of corn/soybeans 
 Parameter  Estimates 
Variable Naïve  Adjusted 
Intercept  1.3315 2.0490 
Crop  -0.2821 -0.2502 
Coop  -0.4653 -1.3571 
HHNW  -7.3e-08 -9.76e-08 
V of P  -2.26e-07 -2.38e-07 
OFI  -3.78e-06 -3.9e-06 
D/A  0.1299 0.1506 
Hobby  -0.4015 -0.4484 
Age  -0.0290 -0.0355 
Edu  0.8690* 0.9091* 
IL dummy  -0.1018 -0.2306 
IN dummy  0.0265 -0.4146 
IA dummy  -0.4575 -0.4470 
OH dummy  0.5126 0.5130 
04 dummy  -0.2135 -0.0568 
05 dummy  0.4995 0.6331 
*Significant at 5% 
 Discussion and Conclusions 
While contract theory implies that there exists a link between the characteristics of the 
principal and agent and the resulting contract between the parties, there seems to be a 
lack of support for this relationship in the limited empirical literature devoted to contracts 
in agriculture.  We add to the empirical literature on agricultural contracts by applying an 
econometric method which allows for endogenous matching between contracting parties.  
The estimation of the contracting equation is done using an instrumental variables 
approach to correct for this potential endogeneity. 
Applying this method to ARMS survey data for corn and soybean producers in 
five Midwestern states from 2003-2005, this paper examines the effect of producer and 
contractor characteristics on contract design while controlling for potential endogeneity 
in the matching of farmers and contractors.  We find evidence of producer characteristics 
impacting the decision to grow corn or soybeans under a formal marketing contract 
agreement.  However, we do not find any evidence of producer or contractor 
characteristics impacting the specific attributes of the marketing arrangements at the 
contract level (i.e. pricing or quantity specifications within the contract). 
These results are surprising and, if accurate, suggest that further work in the area 
of agricultural contracts is needed to identify the determinants of specific contract design.  
However, the results should be interpreted with care for a number of reasons.  Most 
principal and agent characteristics that are postulated to effect contract choice and design 
are unobserved (i.e. risk preference) and therefore observed proxy measures are used in 
place of the unobserved variables.  The explanative power of our models are limited by 
how well the observed variables proxy the true unobserved characteristics.  References 
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